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Abstract:  Klein & Barron (2016) propose that subjective experience in humans arises in the 
midbrain and then argue that insects have the capacity for subjective experience because 
their nervous system can perform neural processing similar to that of the midbrain. This 
approach ultimately fails because it is built on the false premise that the midbrain is the 
source of the awareness of sensory stimuli. I instead propose that the capacity for subjective 
experience must be based on fundamental neural computations that generate the “what it 
feels like” experience. Two such computations associated with metarepresentations and high 
level representations entering working memory are discussed as possible measures of the 
capacity for subjective experience.  
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Introduction 
 
No extant and scientifically plausible theory of phenomenal consciousness proposes that the 
midbrain is the site of subjective experience (e.g., Rolls, 2007; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011; 
Markov and Kennedy, 2013; Dehaene et al., 2014; Cleeremans et al., 2014; Koch et al., 2016; 
Wolf, 2016). The arguments for why the midbrain is not the generator of phenomenal 
consciousness have been clearly articulated (Key, 2015; Key, 2016a; Key, 2016b; Key, 2016c; 
Key, 2016d). To suggest, as do Klein & Barron (2016), that the insect nervous system is 
capable of subjective experience because it appears to perform neural computations similar 
to those in the vertebrate midbrain is to ignore the weight of the contradictory evidence. 
Their conclusion about insect consciousness is no stronger than the proposition that any 
animal with a central nervous system has the capacity for subjective experience.  
 
This is not to say that the approach adopted by Klein & Barron is inappropriate. The idea that 
the search for subjective experience in animals should be based on neurobiological 
mechanisms is well founded. I have previously advocated this strategy and used it to reveal 
that fish lack the necessary neural architecture to support phenomenal consciousness (Key, 
2016a; Key, 2016b). However, I have cautioned that this approach is more suitable for 
lineally related species with similar neurodevelopmental histories and neuroanatomical 
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structures (Key, 2016). Attempting to apply neurobiological arguments, particularly those 
based on neuroanatomical structure, across widely disparate phyla such as Arthropoda and 
Chordata, and particularly between classes such as Insecta and Mammalia, leads only to 
weak inferences. The strength of Klein & Barron’s approach has been to search instead for 
functionally equivalent neural processing between insects and humans. As previously 
indicated (Key, 2016d), their approach fails because they inappropriately use nonconscious 
midbrain processing rather than conscious processing mechanisms in their assessment.  
 
Looking for Another Way Forward 
 
Given the disparate morphologies of human and insect nervous systems (Key, 2016e), an 
alternative approach for assessing subjective capacity is needed. A possible way forward is to 
identify neural computations (and generic circuit architectures capable of performing these 
computations) that are necessary for phenomenal consciousness. It has been proposed in 
several prominent theories of consciousness that the “what it is like” experience of a sensory 
stimulus requires an independent secondary observer neural network to introspect (i.e., to 
observe and interrogate) the signal processing within the neural network creating the 
primary representation of the sensory stimuli (Rolls, 2007; Cleeremans, 2014; Cruse and 
Shilling, 2015). This metarepresentation concept percolated out of philosophical discussions 
concerning the theory of mind (Leslie, 1987). However, in this context they were considered 
to be copies of the primary representation; it was only later that they were proposed to be 
representations of the underlying neural computations generating the representations of 
sensory stimuli (Singer, 1998; Cleeremans et al., 2007; Pasquali et al., 2010). Cleeremans et 
al. (2007) initially demonstrated with simple computer simulations that these observer 
neural networks were capable of associating the internal states of other independent 
networks with their future outcome. Because of this predictive power, the observer network 
could generate an expected outcome and could hence be said to be “cognizant” of what the 
network being monitored was processing. Thus, the observer network (most likely in the 
form of a recurrent neural network; Cruse, 2003) appears to possess the antecedent origins 
of awareness or subjective experience.  
 
The field of “machine consciousness” is particularly interested in understanding the 
architecture necessary for creating phenomenal consciousness or what is referred to as 
“synthetic phenomenology” in robots (Chrisley, 2009). Computational models have been 
developed that use secondary neural networks to create metarepresentations of the primary 
neural networks that generate representations of sensory stimuli. Initial results are 
encouraging in that these computational models can generate conscious-like visual 
behaviours in robots that were not directly encoded for in the models (Arrabales et al., 
2011).  
 
Thus, there are now strong philosophical and empirical reasons to consider 
metarepresentations of neural computations generating sensory representations as a 
necessary property for a nervous system to be able to subjectively experience sensory 
stimuli. It is not required at this stage to define how metarepresentations generate 
subjective experience. For our goal of having a measure of the capacity for subjective 
experience, it is sufficient to merely propose that a phenomenally conscious nervous system 
must possess observer neural networks that are able to introspect and create 
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metarepresentations of its sensory neural processing. While this would not be proof of 
subjective consciousness, it would provide insight into whether insects have (at least) one 
necessary neural property underlying subjective experience. 
 
Working memory, or the ability to maintain neural representations in the absence of the 
initial stimulus that generated that activity in order to allow processing for the purpose of 
goal-directed behaviour, is believed to be essential for phenomenal consciousness 
(Baddeley, 1992; Osaka, 2016). Although all neural activity in working memory may not be 
conscious (Sato and Silvanto, 2014), there are some characteristics of the neural activity in 
working memory that seem necessary for subsequent progression into consciousness. Since 
the attentional capacity of working memory in humans is limited, it has been argued that 
low level representations of sensory stimuli (such as those in V1 visual cortex) are far too 
information-rich to enter into consciousness (Cohen et al., 2016). Higher order 
representations (such as those generated in the temporal lobe) of lower order 
representations are needed so as not to overload the attentional capacity of working 
memory and to provide a rich vivid mental image of the visual world. These higher order 
representations are proposed to be statistical summaries of the low level visual 
representations. I propose that if the insect nervous system is capable of visual 
consciousness, it must possess neural circuitry capable of generating higher order 
representations or statistical summaries of low level visual representations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, I have suggested that to begin to understand whether insects have the capacity 
for subjective experience it is essential to assess whether the insect nervous system has the 
neural architecture to perform computations that are recognised as fundamental for 
phenomenal consciousness. I have highlighted two such possible computations: (i) 
generating metarepresentations of sensory processing and (ii) creating high order 
representations of low level sensory representations in the form of statistical summaries. 
The challenge is to now identify the neural architecture(s) that can perform these 
computations so that we have simple tools for assessing the likelihood that insects are 
capable of subjective experience. 
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